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Executive Summary
An influenza pandemic is a worldwide outbreak or epidemic caused by a strain of
influenza virus to which few if any humans have immunity developed by prior exposure.
Influenza pandemics occur predictably but at unpredictable intervals; three occurred
during the 20th century. The most serious pandemic on record, the “Spanish flu” of 19181919 caused an estimated 20-100 million deaths worldwide and over 500,000 deaths in
the United States. Many pandemics are believed to occur when a strain of influenza
circulating among birds (avian influenza), acquires the ability to cause serious illness and
to spread effectively among people. Beginning in 1997 and continuing through 2005, a
widespread outbreak of avian influenza (H5N1) has affected birds in multiple Asian
countries. That strain has demonstrated the ability to cause lethal disease among humans
and created concern that it might evolve into a strain of virus capable of causing a
pandemic. It is not known whether that will occur, but it is certain that another influenza
pandemic will afflict humans at some point in the future.
An influenza pandemic of the severity of the 1918 pandemic could cause over a
million Utahns to become ill and result in over 500,000 outpatient doctor visits, 15,000
hospitalizations, and 4,000 deaths over the course of a year. Critical assumptions used in
developing this plan included: 1) outbreaks would probably occur widely across the state
and nation, limiting the ability to share resources among jurisdictions; 2) vaccine would
not be available until several months had elapsed; 3) shortages of critical medicines and
other supplies would occur, including antiviral medications; 4) capacity to provide
medical care would be severely stressed or exceeded; and 5) absenteeism rates and fear
would stress ability to provide for essential community services including police, fire,
water, food, transportation and sanitation.
The goals of this plan are, first, to minimize serious illness and death, and second,
to limit societal disruption and economic losses. The plan is intended to coordinate with
global and national plans developed by the World Health Organization (WHO) and U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). It outlines responsibilities and
activities in 5 areas (Planning and Coordination; Surveillance, Investigation and
Containment; Vaccine and Antivirals; Communications; and Health Care and Emergency
Response) for the three pandemic planning phases outlined by the WHO (Interpandemic,
Pandemic Alert, and Pandemic Periods).
This plan outlines activities and responsibilities for government public health
agencies and builds upon preparedness assets developed at federal, state, and local levels
of government and in the private sector. Nevertheless, a serious influenza pandemic
would pose substantial challenges to existing capabilities. The next phase of planning
should involve wider community efforts to address those challenges. We have identified
six critical policy questions that should guide those efforts.
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Introduction
An influenza pandemic has the potential to cause widespread illness and death. Planning
and preparedness before the next pandemic strikes are critical for an effective response.
Utah’s Pandemic Influenza Response Plan describes a coordinated strategy to prepare for
and respond to an influenza pandemic.
Influenza causes seasonal worldwide epidemics of disease that result in an average of
36,000 deaths each year in the United States. A pandemic – or global epidemic – occurs
when there is a major change in the influenza virus so that most or all people in the
world’s population have no immunity against the virus. Three pandemics occurred
during the 20th century; the most severe pandemic (1918) caused over 500,000 deaths in
the U.S. and 20-100 million deaths worldwide. Recent outbreaks of human disease
caused by avian influenza strains in Asia and Europe have highlighted the potential of
new strains to be introduced into the population. An avian influenza (H5N1) virus
capable of directly infecting humans was first detected in Hong Kong in 1997. That virus
strain has been circulating widely in several Asian countries since 2003. Avian influenza
H5N1 has caused 122 human cases and 62 deaths (WHO as of October 24, 2005) and has
become enzootic in wild migratory birds. If these strains acquire the ability to be
transmitted effectively from person to person a pandemic may occur. Regardless of
whether the currently circulating avian influenza (H5N1) strains evolve so as to cause a
pandemic or not, history indicates that we will experience another pandemic of influenza
sooner or later.
Characteristics of an influenza pandemic that must be considered in preparedness and
response planning include: 1) simultaneous impacts in communities across the state and
the U.S., limiting the ability of any jurisdiction to provide support and assistance to other
areas; 2) an overwhelming burden of ill persons requiring hospitalization or outpatient
medical care; 3) shortages and delays in the availability of vaccines and antiviral
medications; 4) disruption of national and community infrastructures including health
care, transportation, commerce, utilities and public safety; and 5) global spread of
infection with outbreaks throughout the world.
The Utah Department of Health is preparing to effectively respond to the issues
mentioned above. This progress has been accomplished through programs specific for
influenza as well as programs focused on increasing preparedness for bioterrorism and
emerging infectious disease threats. In addition, resources have been allocated to
improve statewide influenza surveillance, increase influenza testing capacity at the Utah
Public Health Laboratory, assess the need for and potential uses of an antiviral drug
stockpile, develop means to deliver vaccine against the pandemic influenza strain once it
becomes available, and improve health care system readiness at the community level.

Goals
1) To minimize serious illness and deaths.
2) To minimize societal disruption and economic loss.
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Planning Assumptions
The Utah Pandemic Influenza Response Plan was based on a number of assumptions,
including: how quickly an influenza pandemic will spread; how many people will be
infected; how long it will take to develop a vaccine; mismatch between demand and a
limited supply of vaccine; the availability of antiviral medications; and the impact a
pandemic will have on health services (i.e., both the demand for services and the
proportion of healthcare providers who are likely to become ill). These assumptions have
shaped decisions about how resources should be used, and the steps Utah should take to
prepare. These assumptions were based on available information about past pandemics,
especially the 1918 pandemic. It is important to recognize that we cannot predict many
aspects of a pandemic and the plan must include the flexibility to adjust to the
characteristics of an actual pandemic.
This plan was also developed within the context of existing public health law. Specific
planning assumptions are as follows:
Assumptions
1.
An influenza pandemic will cause simultaneous outbreaks across the United
States limiting the ability to transfer assistance from one jurisdiction to another.
2.
Utah may have no warning or as long as a three-month warning before the arrival
of the pandemic influenza virus within the state’s borders.
3.
No vaccine will be available until 6-8 months after onset of the pandemic. The
timing of vaccine availability for use in Utah will depend on the timing of arrival
of the pandemic in Utah relative to onset elsewhere
4.
Two doses of vaccine (administered 30 days apart) will be needed to develop
immunity to the pandemic virus.
5.
Once the vaccine is available, it will take five months to produce an adequate
supply of vaccine for the entire US population (approximately 20 percent of the
vaccine will be produced per month).
6.
The federal government will purchase the first 20% of vaccine produced and will
distribute it directly to states. In Utah, 240,000 persons (based on 2005
population estimates) could receive two doses of vaccine from the initial federal
supply.
7.
In a given community, the influenza epidemic will last at least one month.
8.
The first wave of pandemic influenza will be followed by a second wave arriving
three to nine months after the first wave.
9.
The “first wave” may have the following effects on the general population in Utah
(est. 2005 population 2,400,000):
 Clinically Ill (ILI attack rate=25%): 250,000-400,000
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10.

11.

12.

 Require Outpatient Care:
125,000-250,000
 Require Hospitalization:
3,750-10,000
 Fatalities:
1,000-4,000
The “second wave” may have the following affects on the general population in
Utah assuming 1918 severity (est. 2005 population 2,400,000):
Clinically Ill (ILI attack rate of 5%): 50,000-80,000
Require Outpatient Care:
25,000-50,000
Require Hospitalization:
750-2,000
Fatalities:
250-1,000
Total persons affected in Utah for “1918-like” pandemic lasting one year:
---Clinically ill:
> 1,000,000
---Require outpatient care:
> 500,000
---Require hospitalization:
> 15,000
---Deaths:
> 4,000
As is true of most diseases, an influenza pandemic is likely to disproportionately
affect vulnerable populations, such as the poor, uninsured, ethnic and racial
minorities, and those with disabilities. Attempts to meet the special needs of
those populations needs to be addressed in planning.

Planning Phases and Response Areas
Utah’s Pandemic Influenza Response Plan is divided according to the three major
pandemic periods described by the World Health Organization (1). The more detailed
phases described in that plan are also described here for the reader’s information but
activities are not specified according to the more detailed phases in this plan.
I. Inter-Pandemic Period
Phase 1: No new influenza subtypes detected in humans. Human risk from known viruses
circulating in animals believed to be low.
Phase 2: A circulating animal virus poses substantial risk of human disease.

II. Pandemic alert period
Phase 3: Human infection(s) with new subtype, but no human-to-human spread, or at most rare
instances of spread to a close contact.
Phase 4: Small cluster with limited human-to-human spread but spread is highly localized
suggesting the virus is not well adapted to humans.
Phase 5: Larger cluster(s) but human-to-human spread still localized.

IV. Pandemic period
Phase 6: Increased and sustained transmission in general population.

Activities in each pandemic period are organized into six components that were based on
those described by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)(2):
1. Planning and Coordination
2. Surveillance, Investigation and Containment
3. Vaccine and Antiviral Medications
5

4. Communications
5. Healthcare and Emergency Response
For each pandemic period, the plan provides background response information and lists
the activities and responsibilities of response partners (e.g., Department of Health and
Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Utah Department of
Health (UDOH), Division of Emergency Services and Homeland Security (DESHS),
Local Health Departments, hospitals and other health care agencies/organizations).
The appropriate response measures will be determined by the epidemiologic
characteristics of the pandemic including: age-specific attack rates and severity, the
overall severity of illness; variations in severity among different risk groups; and the
efficiency of transmission from person to person. Utah’s response plan for the health
care system is based on best estimates at this time but will have to be modified if the
epidemiology of the outbreak is significantly different from the planning assumptions.

Relation to Other Preparedness Planning
Planning for an influenza pandemic in Utah builds upon many strengths developed during
preparations for the Olympic Winter Games of 2002, and strengthened by responses to
events including the 2001 anthrax mail attacks, West Nile virus, and SARS. Several
elements of existing public health and emergency preparedness planning will play critical
roles in the response to an influenza pandemic. These include:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)

Enhanced surveillance systems and epidemiologic capacity to rapidly detect,
characterize, and provide information about a pandemic of influenza;
Implementation of 24x7 response capacity within state and local public health
agencies;
Mass vaccination plans and experience exercising or using those plans;
Strategic National Stockpile and plans to deploy it in Utah;
Public information and risk communication plans;
Strengthened laboratory capacity;
Inter-agency coordination and communication, including incident command;
Medical care system surge capacity planning;
Community-wide all hazard disaster planning and preparation;
Strong partnerships and cooperation among state and local government
agencies, hospitals and other parts of the health care system, law enforcement
and emergency responders.

Responsibilities and Response Activities by Pandemic Period
By definition, a pandemic is a global event. The World Health Organization (WHO) has
primary responsibility for efforts to rapidly detect, monitor, and respond to an influenza
pandemic internationally. Current information about WHO activities is available at:
<http://www.who.int/csr/en/>. Within the United States, the Department of Health and
6

Human Services is responsible for pandemic planning. In the event of a pandemic, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) will be responsible for surveillance
and will take the lead in communicating with and coordinating federal and state public
health activities.
At the state level, response to the pandemic will require strong coordination among
UDOH, other State agencies, the 12 Utah local health departments, and with hospitals
and clinics. The media and many other entities will also be important partners in an
effective response.
A brief, general overview of activities by pandemic period is listed below. This list
focuses primarily on state and local public health activities, but also includes some
activities by key response partners.
Inter-pandemic Period.
No new influenza subtypes have been detected in humans.
A. Planning and Coordination:
1.) Establish a planning process to prepare for an influenza pandemic.
2.) Establish and obtain agreement from elected officials and from key response
partners for a process to make critical policy decisions including the allocation of
scarce resources (e.g., vaccination and antiviral medication guidelines, and
provision of medical care when resources have been exhausted).
3.) Complete an influenza pandemic response plan.
4.) Engage and educate key response partners about the threat of an influenza
pandemic and about the pandemic influenza plan.
5.) Assist local health departments and tribal governments as needed in developing
pandemic influenza plans for their jurisdictions.
6.) Conduct scenario-based exercises to assess and improve response capability and
assist in identifying and clarifying roles and responsibilities for response to an
influenza pandemic.
7.) Review and update plan annually with key response partners.
8.) Assess legal authority to respond to an influenza pandemic, including authority
for control measures as well as liability protection for response partners.
B. Surveillance, Investigation and Containment:
1.) Monitor international and national influenza surveillance results.
2.) Conduct routine influenza surveillance
3.) Periodically evaluate and strengthen Utah’s influenza surveillance system to
prepare it to detect a pandemic strain and to meet information needs during a
pandemic.
4.) Disseminate reports of influenza activity thru established means.
C. Vaccines/Antiviral Medications:
1.) Measure vaccine coverage rate statewide annually.
2.) Institute programs to enhance influenza vaccination rates in high-risk groups.
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3.) Enhance pneumococcal vaccine coverage rates in high-risk groups.
4.) Develop pandemic vaccine/antiviral distribution plans and begin planning with
private providers based on their roles in those plans.
5.) Assist local health departments to draft and exercise mass vaccination clinic
protocols.
6.) Consider establishing a Utah stockpile of antiviral medications.
D. Healthcare and Emergency Response:
1.) In coordination with local health departments, develop estimates of the impact on
health care of an influenza pandemic, and of the resources and personnel required
to care for the anticipated numbers of affected persons.
2.) Assess existing surge capacity and surge capacity planning against the needs
resulting from an influenza pandemic, and update as appropriate.
3.) Engage with health care providers, community leaders, and other key partners to
develop plans for providing care during an influenza pandemic. These will
include plans for when existing capacity has been exhausted, such as alternative
care facilities or home-based care.
4.) Assess existing all-hazard emergency response plans against anticipated needs
during an influenza pandemic, including:
a. Capacity to respond to a sustained epidemic (estimated 6-14 weeks, with
possibility of a second wave);
b. Capacity to respond to an event when similar events elsewhere severely
limit the availability of federal resources or sharing of resources across
jurisdictions;
c. Ability to continue medical care, provide care for dependents of ill adults,
and maintain critical community services when ≥20% of workers are
absent due to illness.
E. Communications:
1.) Develop messages in several formats and languages for communicating with the
general public and with response partners, including
a. Fact sheets on influenza, influenza vaccine, and antiviral medications;
b. Video clips; and
c. Training materials such as slide sets, posters, etc.
2.) Assess existing public and operational communications plans and protocols for
use during an influenza pandemic; and identify key communication issues and
the resources needed to adequately respond to and influenza pandemic.
Pandemic Alert Period
Human infection with a new subtype of influenza virus has occurred.
During this period, UDOH will monitor events that indicate altered risk of a pandemic or
that should prompt changes in our response plans. These might include emerging
information about the novel virus, changes in vaccine or antiviral medication research or
production, as well as any modifications in national or international pandemic plans.
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Efforts to complete activities outlined for the inter-pandemic period will be assessed and
accelerated.
Depending on the level of pandemic risk, surveillance systems and laboratory
surveillance of viral isolates may be enhanced to increase the ability to detect the virus in
Utah. As information becomes available about vaccine development, antiviral stockpiles,
or other issues, the pandemic plan will be adjusted or enhanced to incorporate that new
information.
A. Planning and Coordination:
1.) Upon declaration of a Pandemic Alert Period or a change in phase within the
Pandemic Alert Period, UDOH will convene a Pandemic Influenza Planning
Group to review the overall plan and assess progress toward implementing key
components of that plan.
2.) UDOH will actively monitor reports from the WHO and CDC regarding spread of
the novel virus and disseminate as appropriate to response partners.
3.) UDOH will actively monitor information from CDC and DHHS, and
recommendations from the National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC) and
Advisory Committee on Immunization Policy (ACIP) related to the novel virus
and national preparations for response.
4.) Upon learning of substantive information about the virus or preparations for the
virus, UDOH will review the Pandemic Response Plan and adjust as appropriate.
5.) UDOH will disseminate key findings about the virus, and relevant international
and national events to response partners in Utah.
6.) An update regarding status of preparedness and critical areas that need to be
addressed will be prepared and delivered to UDOH leadership.
B. Surveillance, Investigation and Containment:
1.) Assess existing surveillance for influenza and, based on national and international
guidelines and information about the pandemic risk, implement enhancements to
detect presence of the implicated strain in Utah.
a.) Consider enhanced surveillance of persons returning from travel to
affected areas and potential for use of quarantine/isolation protocols.
2.) Assess system-wide information system capacity to respond to the need for timely
surveillance and epidemiologic investigation data on a pandemic.
C. Vaccines/Antiviral Medications:
1.) Monitor emerging information about vaccine development and about antiviral
evaluation and supplies and disseminate as appropriate to response partners.
2.) Continue preparations for vaccine administration, including:
a. Conduct vaccine administration training;
b. Assess and exercise vaccine/medication distribution system;
c. Meet with response partners and review major elements of the vaccine and
antiviral medication distribution plans and modify as needed;
d. Consider stockpiling critical vaccination supplies (e.g., syringes, alcohol
wipes, gloves, gauze, etc.).
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3.) Assess capability of existing information systems to track supply and
administration of vaccinations, occurrence of vaccine adverse effects, and vaccine
coverage of target populations.
D. Healthcare and Emergency Response:
1.) Convene public health and health care system leaders to evaluate capability of
health care system to respond to a pandemic based on current information and to
develop plans to improve that capability.
2.) Develop plans and guidelines for triage and treatment of influenza patients in
outpatient, inpatient and non-traditional healthcare settings and distribute those
plans and guidelines for comment/review by appropriate agencies, entities and
personnel.
E. Communications:
1.) The State Epidemiologist will provide regular updates to UDOH leadership,
Local Health Officers, and other key community partners about developments
related to the virus and its spread and of national and international preparations
for response.
2.) UDOH will update elected officials and response partners upon declaration of a
novel virus alert or of a change in the Pandemic Phase indicating increased risk of
pandemic.
3.) Existing communication plans will be evaluated and exercised.
4.) Implement public communication strategies to prepare Utah citizens for the
possibility and consequences of an influenza pandemic.
Pandemic Period
Increased and sustained transmission in general population of a new subtype of influenza
virus somewhere in the world..
In the pandemic period, the pandemic alert activities will continue at an intensified level.
Surveillance efforts will be increased to monitor both influenza illness and circulating
influenza viruses. If vaccine is available, distribution will be implemented according to
appropriate recommendations and security measures will be put in place to ensure that
vaccine will be given first to groups of highest priority. UDOH will augment information
flow to Local Health Departments, medical providers and other stakeholders, including
materials in Spanish and the other major languages in Utah. Upon detection of the
pandemic strain in Utah (or likelihood of its imminent arrival), State and local emergency
management agencies and hospitals will be advised to consider activating their
emergency response systems. Local coroners and funeral directors will be advised to
prepare for increases in the number of dead and provided with any infection control
guidelines specific to the pandemic virus.
During this period, available resources may be exhausted in a number of areas, including
public health surveillance and investigation, medical care, and vaccine and antiviral
supplies. When this occurs, prioritization will be needed to shift resources to meet
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highest priority needs. This is likely to be most critical for medical care; it is expected
that alternate treatment sites and home-care protocols will be needed.
A. Planning and Coordination:
1.) Activate Pandemic Response Plan and relevant components of all-hazard disaster
planning, including emergency epidemiology response plan and if necessary the
Emergency Coordination Center.
2.) Notify UDOH response personnel, Local Health Officers, and other response
partners of the declaration of a Pandemic Period using Utah Notification and
Information System (UNIS) and other appropriate means.
3.) The Pandemic Influenza Operations Group (PFOG) will meet to review known
facts and prepare a situation report to EDO including recommendations for
immediate actions and a request for any needed response resources.
4.) UDOH will assess available resources and advise response personnel of potential
need to alter personal plans to meet the needs of a pandemic response.
5.) An information management process will be implemented to monitor national and
global events and changes in recommendations and to disseminate information to
UDOH leadership, local health departments, and to other response partners.
6.) A situation report on the pandemic will be prepared each week or more often if
needed and distributed to response partners. Detection of the pandemic strain or
evidence of its circulation in Utah will trigger a UNIS alert and conference call.
7.) State Epidemiologist/BEMS director may request delivery of Strategic National
Stockpile assets.
8.) A process of regular conference calls will be established with response partners.
9.) Adjust response efforts based on analysis of effectiveness of response efforts,
changes in national or global recommendations, or changes in available resources.
B. Surveillance, Investigation and Containment:
1.) Implement enhanced surveillance plan to monitor both influenza cases and
circulating influenza virus types until the pandemic strain has been detected in
Utah.
2.) Upon detection of pandemic strain or evidence of its circulation in Utah,
implement enhanced surveillance to monitor the impact, including both disease
occurrence and affected populations.
3.) Upon detection of pandemic strain or evidence of its circulation in Utah,
implement surveillance to monitor resource availability and use (e.g., hospital bed
census and availability, urgent care visit volume, and absenteeism in critical
workforce areas).
4.) Conduct regular analyses of surveillance data to monitor changes in
epidemiology, assess effectiveness of response efforts, and identify need for
containment efforts.
5.) Prepare regular surveillance reports and disseminate to response partners and
general public.
6.) According to national/global recommendations or based on epidemiologic
findings in Utah, initiate containment measures to limit spread of pandemic strain
in Utah. Such restrictions may include:
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a. Travel restrictions (including air and ground transportation)
b. Screening of persons arriving from affected areas
c. Cancellation/closure of mass gatherings (e.g., concerts, sports events,
schools)
C. Vaccines/Antiviral Medications:
1.) Review vaccination priority groups and vaccination distribution plans for
appropriateness based on anticipated or actual supply and characteristics of the
pandemic. Modify as appropriate.
2.) As vaccine becomes available, implement vaccination plan.
3.) Monitor vaccine administration and vaccine reactions.
4.) Review antiviral use recommendations based on supply and the characteristics of
the pandemic and pandemic virus.
5.) Implement antiviral administration plan.
6.) Monitor use and if possible effectiveness of antiviral medications.
7.) Analyze effectiveness and use of vaccination/antiviral medications and adjust
their use as appropriate based on results and supplies.
8.) Using “first wave” experience, analyze efficacy of vaccine/antiviral medication
distribution system and make changes as appropriate.
9.) Review vaccine priority groups and modify as epidemiology of pandemic dictates
D. Healthcare and Emergency Response:
1.) All response partners will be notified of the pandemic via UNIS (Utah
Notification and Information System) and other means as necessary.
2.) Establish means of coordination and communication with State and local
emergency operation centers as they are activated.
3.) Guidelines for triage and treatment will be updated and distributed as information
becomes available
4.) Pandemic inFluenza Operations Group (PFOG) will meet at least weekly to
assess response as well as information from international and national response
partners. PFOG will formulate recommendations for dissemination or for
consideration by the policy decision-making group as indicated.
5.) Implement use of stockpiles of medical supplies and distribution systems.
6.) Implement emergency response procedures as required to maintain essential
services.
7.) Implement plans to provide care and establish alternative care sites as required,
monitor the capacity of the local system to provide care, and work with other state
and national response agencies as required.
8.) Bureau of Emergency Medical Services (BEMS) will be the primary state agency
assessing hospital/other medical facility response activities
9.) Division of Emergency Services and Homeland Security (DESHS) will be the
primary state agency responsible for transport of equipment, supplies and
personnel.
E. Communications:
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1.) Implement public information and communication plan, including, as appropriate,
establishing a joint information center (JIC), convening regular public information
officer (PIO) conference calls among response partners, and establishing a plan
for regular public/media communications as appropriate to urgency of situation.
2) The State Epidemiologist will initiate telephone conference calls with response
partners to discuss release of information to the news media. These conference
calls will also determine which local or state agency will take the lead role in a
news conference.
3) UDOH PIO will implement plan for regular communication of information to
public, including measures that people can take to protect themselves and to limit
spread.
4) The PIO will coordinate communication needs as regards media access,
messaging, issue tracking, staff briefing and resource tracking throughout the
public information response effort.

Next Steps for Pandemic Influenza Planning:
This plan describes both existing capabilities and those that must be developed for an
effective response to a pandemic of influenza. Ongoing work will provide additional
detail on relevant components of the plan in order to provide additional guidance to the
public health community and other partners. Modifications may also be needed as
information becomes available, such as through global events or as plans developed by
organizations such as the WHO and the U.S. DHHS are modified.
An influenza pandemic will reach into every sector of Utah and can have an impact that
substantially exceeds the resources and capabilities of public health agencies and of other
response partners. The next phase of preparation for an influenza pandemic will focus on
stimulating community planning around the key policy questions identified in this
document. Agencies and entities that will be more extensively involved in the next phase
will include hospitals and medical care providers, other State agencies, and providers of
essential community services (e.g., food service community, transportation industry,
police and fire departments, etc.).

Key Policy Questions:
As part of this planning effort, we have identified these key policy questions that can
guide the community planning phase of preparation for a possible influenza pandemic.
1) Assess adequacy of health care surge capacity. Despite existing surge capacity plans,
an influenza pandemic could overwhelm the capacity of the health care system to
deliver medical care.
a) The current capabilities (including personnel, facility and bed, and supplies) need
to be assessed against pandemic scenarios. That assessment should recognize the
variability of health care capability across Utah, especially between urban and
rural areas.
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b) Decisions need to be made about how to augment that capacity and/or how to
provide care when those resources have been exceeded and plans made and
funding identified to implement those approaches.
i) An important aspect of surge capacity concerns decision(s) to stockpile
critical medical and infection control supplies that will be in short supply and
how to finance, store, and maintain those stockpiles.
ii) Special consideration should be given to the special burden placed on health
care workers and to providing appropriate protection to those workers to help
assure they are able to provide care during a pandemic.
c) Decisions need to be made about how and when to communicate to the public the
expectation that a serious pandemic would exceed the capacity of the current
health care system to deliver care and the consequences of that reality.
2) Determine whether to create a Utah antiviral stockpile. The National Vaccine
Advisory Committee (NVAC) recommended that a national stockpile of antiviral
drugs be established with optimally 133 million courses, and at a minimum 40 million
courses. Currently, the national stockpile is only approximately 2 million courses of
treatment. Utah should consider developing a state stockpile to meet the shortfall in
U.S. preparations. NVAC also recommended that antiviral medications be used
primarily for treatment and not for prophylaxis under most scenarios.
3) Determine how to deliver vaccine during a pandemic. During an ordinary influenza
season in Utah, influenza vaccine is delivered by a hybrid public/private sector effort.
A decision should be made on how to best deliver influenza vaccine during a
pandemic and preparations made to implement that system rapidly and effectively.
4) Establish a credible decision-making mechanism. Response to an influenza pandemic
will require difficult decisions about allocation of scarce resources, including triage
decisions about health care in shortage situations, prioritization of antiviral
medications and vaccine, and institution of measures to limit disease spread (e.g.,
travel restrictions, cancellation of public gatherings, and quarantine or isolation). A
transparent and inclusive decision-making mechanism/body should be established to
help elicit community support for difficult decisions.
5) Assess and develop plans to minimize community and economic disruption from an
influenza pandemic. A pandemic could cause absenteeism rates of greater than 25%
due both to illness of essential service workers and the need for those workers to
provide care for family and friends. This would challenge the ability to maintain
critical community services, such as police and fire, transportation, water and food,
and basic sanitation. A critical assessment of existing emergency response plans to
meet this challenge is needed. This should involve nearly all elements of the public
and private sectors in Utah and substantial leadership will be needed to assure that
this occurs.
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6) Consideration is needed for systems to provide economic and social support and
essential services for people who are confined to home or an alternate setting due to
illness, or because of imposition of isolation or quarantine to limit spread of disease.
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Table of Internal UDOH Assignments and Responsibilities:
Organizational Unit
Executive Director’s
Office (EDO)

State Epidemiologist
Bureau of
Epidemiology (BOE)

Immunization
Program (IP)

Office of Public
Information and
Marketing (OPIM)
Utah Public Health
Laboratory (UPHL)
Strategic National
Stockpile (SNS)
Program
Bureau of Emergency
Medical Services
(BEMS)

State Nursing
Director

Responsibility
• Overall responsibility for public health preparedness for an influenza
pandemic
• Responsible for updating the Governor’s office about preparedness and
events during an influenza pandemic.
• Under direction of EDO, overall responsibility for preparedness for an
influenza pandemic
• Lead entity in UDOH for pandemic planning and response in the event
of a pandemic.
• Surveillance for influenza prior to and during a pandemic.
• Monitor surveillance reports – national and international – and
disseminate to partners as appropriate.
• Monitor WHO and CDC bulletins and other information about the virus
(e.g., attack rates, transmission potential, severity of illness, antiviral
susceptibility) and assess to determine if that information affects the
Utah plan.
• Monitor information about antiviral medication development,
distribution, stockpiling and distribution.
• Lead entity for vaccine planning prior to and for implementation of
vaccine delivery during a pandemic.
• Monitor influenza vaccine coverage annually and during a pandemic.
• Monitor recommendations related to vaccine preparation, evaluation,
and distribution from national sources including NVAC, ACIP, CDC,
FDA, DHHS; assess for significance and disseminate as appropriate.
• Responsible for developing materials for public release (in cooperation
with IP and BOE)
• Responsible for coordinating media and public information about this
issue prior to and during an influenza pandemic.
• Responsible for laboratory surveillance for influenza and detection of
novel virus strains as part of national/global network.
• Monitor plans for use and distribution of the antiviral stockpile
• Establish plans for distribution in coordination with local health
departments and health care providers according to policy decisions
about distribution..
• Responsible for assessing medical surge capacity to respond to an
influenza pandemic.
• Responsible for communication and coordination with hospitals
regarding resources during a pandemic.
• Responsible for operation of the UDOH Emergency Coordination
Center.
• Responsible for assessing UDOH capacity for nursing support to local
health departments.
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